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REFORMATION AND THE PAROL 
EVIDENCE RULE 
George E. Palmer* 
T HE parol evidence rule of itself is never an obstacle to reforma-tion, provided there is satisfactory evidence of a mistake in 
integration.1 If the parties intend to express the terms of a trans-
action in a writing, which is then to be looked to as the sole reposi-
tory of those terms, the longstanding tradition of the law courts, 
described as the parol evidence rule, has been that the writing is 
controlling. If through mistake the ·writing failed to express correctly 
what the parties meant to express, the law courts still regarded the 
written word as decisive, but it has been recognized for a long time 
that equity will give relief through correction of the writing. Cer-
tainly by 1801,2 if not earlier, it was settled in English law that the 
parol evidence rule did not bar reformation in equity. Nonetheless, 
there remains a certain amount of confusion due to the occasional 
failure to distinguish between the parol evidence rule and the statute 
of frauds.8 There are cases refusing reformation through the use of 
"parol evidence" which might be thought to rest on an application 
of the parol evidence rule when in fact the reason for denying relief 
was the statute of frauds.4 
As just seen, one effect of the parol evidence rule is that it gives 
rise to the need for reformation, as a means of achieving enforcement 
of the actual agreement, where there has been a mistake in integra-
tion. The fact that the rule does not prevent reformation provides 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1930, J.D. 1932, University of 
Michigan; LL.M. 1940, Columbia University. Editorial Board, Vol. 30, Michigan Law 
Review.-Ed. 
1. In innumerable decisions courts have said that the case for reformation must be 
established by "clear and convincing evidence." Day v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 67 
F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1933); Gagnon v. Pronovost, 97 N.H. 58, 80 A.2d 381 (1951); Broida v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 316 Pa. 444, 175 Atl. 492 (1934); Kirchgestner v. Denver & R.G. 
W.R.R., 118 Utah 41, 233 P.2d 699 (1951); l3ergstrom v. Olson, 39 Wash. 2d 536, 
236 P.2d 1052 (1951). 
2. Townshend v. Stangroom, 6 Ves. 328, 332-38, 31 Eng. Rep. 1076, 1077-79 (Ch. 
1801), per Lord Eldon. To refuse reformation, Story wrote, "would be to allow an act, 
originating in innocence, to operate ultimately as a fraud, by enabling the party, who 
receives the benefit of the mistake, to resist the claims of justice, under the shelter 
of a rule [the parol evidence rule] framed to promote it." 1 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRU· 
DENCE § 155 (3d ed. 1843). 
l!. The effect of the statute of frauds is considered in Palmer, Reformation and the 
Statute of Frauds, 65 MICH. L. REV. 421 (1967). 
4. An example is Le Witt v. Park Ecclesiastical Soc'y, 103 Conn. 285, 130 Atl. 387 
(1925). The case is cited in 35 YALE L.J. 739, 740 (1926), as denying reformation because 
of the parol evidence rule, but a careful study of the opinion makes it clear that the 
statute of frauds was regarded as the stumbling block. 
[833] 
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a perspective for assessment of the rule, and this is a principal pur-
pose of the present article. The availability of reformation raises 
serious doubts as to the wisdom of some common applications of the 
rule. 
I. THE UNCERTAIN SCOPE OF THE p AROL' EVIDENCE RULE 
There is considerable difference between the parol evidence 
rule as stated by some of the leading text writers and as applied by 
most courts. The rule formulated by Wigmore has been stated as 
follows: "Any or all parts of a transaction prior to or contempora-
neous with a writing intended to record them finally are superseded 
and made legally ineffective by the writing."5 In Vligmore's view 
the question whether the writing was a final and exclusive embodi-
ment of the transaction or of some part of it "depends wholly upon 
the intent of the parties ... [to] be sought where always intent must 
be sought, namely, in the conduct and language of the parties and 
the surrounding circumstances."6 Stated boldly, this means that if 
the trier of the facts finds that the parties made an oral agreement 
and intended it to be effective, it is effective even though it adds 
to, varies, qualifies or contradicts the terms of the ·writing, since a 
finding that the extrinsic agreement was intended to be effective 
despite the writing is also a finding that the writing was not in-
tended to displace that agreement. Among contemporary writers 
Corbin has been the most effective advocate of this view. His central 
position is perhaps best summed up in his statement: "The 'parol 
evidence rule' does not itself purport to establish the fact of 'inte-
gration'; and until that fact is established the 'rule' does not purport 
to have any legal operation."7 This general conception seems to have 
5. Chadbourn &: McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule in North Carolina, 9 N.C.L. 
R.Ev. 151, 152 (1930). Dean McCormick's views on the rule are stated more fully in 
McCORMICK, EVIDENCE ch. 24 (1954), and in McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a 
Procedural Device for Control of the Jury, 41 YALE L.J. 365 (1932). 
6. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2430 (3d ed. 1940). 
7. 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 581 (1950). See also id. §§ 576, 582 and 583, as well as Cor• 
bin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L.J. 603 (1944). Williston was not prepared to go 
this far, although his general formulation of the rule followed Wigmore in making 
integration tum on the intent of the parties. 3 WILLISTON, CoNTRAc:rs §§ 632, 633, 636, 
638 (rev. ed. 1936). In § 636 he wrote: "If the parties never adopt,!d the writing as a 
statement of the whole agreement, the rule does not exclude pare,! evidence of addi-
tional promises." In § 633, however, discussing the sources available for determining this 
question, he spoke with apparent approval of the cases holding that "the contract must 
appear on its face to be incomplete in order to permit parol evi:lence of additional 
terms." The text of § 633 remains the same in the current edition of Williston (3d 
ed. 1961), but a change in paragraphing may distort his meaning. Williston's views 
are reflected in REsTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 229, 230, 237 (1932). The difference between 
the Wigmore-Corbin view and the view expressed in the Restater.wnt is discussed in 
MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 396-400 (1962). 
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been adopted in the Uniform Commercial Code, which makes the 
issue turn on whether the writing was "intended by the parties as a 
final expression of their agreement with respect to" the terms that 
are in question.8 
Certainly there are many decisions that do not support this 
conception of the rule. In countless cases the extrinsic evidence has 
been rejected out of hand, merely on the ground that it "varies the 
terms of the writing,"9 without inquiry into whether the writing 
was intended to be a complete and accurate embodiment of the 
agreement.1° Frequently it is recognized that the intention of the 
parties is in theory controlling, but explicitly or otherwise the court 
holds that the writing itself is conclusive on the issue: an appearance 
of completeness is regarded as decisive.11 It is on this point perhaps 
that most of the difference of opinion occurs in modern decisions. 
Some judges have followed Wigmore's view that the ·writing does 
not speak conclusively for itself,12 whereas others adhere to the view 
expressed by the New York court in Higgs v. de Mazirofj,13 that an 
appearance of completeness means "the contract was as a matter of 
law integrated in the writings." 
The effect of the position taken by the New York court will often 
be to enforce a contract differing from the actual agreement, as 
occurred in the Higgs case. In connection with a loan from the 
plaintiff, the defendant executed promissory notes with fixed due 
8. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL ConE § 2-202. It is debatable whether the language quoted 
in the text is meant to permit direct contradiction of a written term which the 
parties did not intend to be an accurate expression of their actual agreement. This is 
the situation in Zell v. American Seating Co., 138 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1943) (discussed in 
text accompanying note 18 infra), and Grubb v. Rockey, 366 Pa. 592, 79 A.2d 255 (1951) 
(discussed in text accompanying note 29 infra). If the propriety of such a contradiction 
was contemplated it would have been better to provide: "intended by the parties as a 
final and accurate expression etc." Still, as a question of interpretation of the statutory 
language, it is arguable that a written term knowingly made inaccurate is not a 
• "final expression" of the agreement with respect to that term. But McCormick reads 
the Code as making the writing conclusive with respect to the terms embodied therein. 
McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 432-33 (1954). See also Hunt Foods & Industries, Inc. v. Doliner, 
26 App. Div. 2d 41, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1966), noted in 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1370 (1966). 
9. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2431 (3d ed. 1940). 
IO. Cases are cited in 3 CORBIN, CONTRACI'S §§ 573, 582 (1950). 
11. Brintnall v. Briggs, 87 Iowa 538, 54 N.W. 531 (1893); Thompson v. Libby, 34 
Minn. 374, 26 N.W. I (1885); Naumberg v. Young, 44 N.J.L. 331 (Ct. App. 1882); Mitchill 
v. Lath, 247 N.Y. 377, 160 N.E. 646 (1928); Hayden v. Hoadley, 94 Vt. 345, lll Atl. 343 
(1920). Other cases are cited in 3 CORBIN, CONTRACI'S § 582 (1950); 4 WILLISTON, CON• 
TRACI'S § 633 (3d ed. 1961). The New York cases are collected in a study by Professor 
Edwin Patterson for the New York Law Revision Commission, N.Y. LEGIS. Doc. No. 
65C, at 265-66 (1955). 
12. Brown v. Oliver, 123 Kan. 711, 256 Pac. 1008 (1927); 3 CORBIN, CONTRACI'S §§ 581, 
582 (1950). 
13. 263 N.Y. 473, 189 N.E. 555 (1934); accord, Seitz v. Brewers' Refrigerating Mach. 
Co., 141 U.S. 510, 517 (1891); Pitcairn v. Philip Hiss Co., 125 Fed. llO (3d Cir. 1903). 
836 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 65:883 
dates and delivered paintings to the plaintiff as security, under a 
written contract that spelled out the details of the security arrange-
ment. When the defendant was sued on the notes his defense was a 
contemporaneous oral agreement that the notes would not be en-
forced until the paintings were sold, an event which had not oc-
curred. The trial court found there was such an agreement and held 
it was a defense, but this was reversed on appeal without questioning 
the findings of fact. 
II. THE Two BASIC SITUATIONS: MISTAKE AND 
INTENTIONAL OMISSION 
The important substantive issue today is the extent to which the 
parol evidence rule prevents enforcement of the actu:1.1 agreement,1-i 
especially when the consequence is to give effect to a contract differ-
ing from that actual agreement.15 The time has come to eliminate 
such consequences. Although some courts16 and writers17 are pre-
pared to do so, it must be recognized that this goe·s further than 
most courts are willing to go. A crucial test is provided by the facts 
of Zell v. American Seating Co.,18 where the Second Circuit applied 
Wigmore's conception of the rule. According to the plaintiff's allega-
tions, accepted as true for purposes of decision, the defendant orally 
agreed to pay him $1,000 a month for his service, in procuring 
national defense contracts, and also agreed to pay him a minimum 
commission of three per cent on the "purchase price" of any con-
tracts so procured. Thereafter a written contract was signed which 
appeared "on its face to embody a complete agreement between" the 
parties, but which omitted the agreement for a commission and 
14. A few examples of this result are as follows: Cargill Comm'n Co. v. F. A. Swart-
wood, 159 Minn. 1, 198 N.W. 536 (1924); Mitchill v. Lath, 247 N.Y. 377, 160 N.E. 646 
(1928); Gianni v. R. Russel & Co., 281 Pa. 320, 126 Atl. 791 (1924). 
15. In one sense this is perhaps true of all refusals to give dfect to the actual 
agreement, but it becomes most apparent in a case such as Grubb v. Rockey, 866 Pa. 
592, 79 A.2d 255 (1951), where, in a suit by the purchaser, a contract for the sale of 
land was specifically enforced at a price of $10,000, despite the trial court's finding 
that the price actually agreed on was $11,200. The vendor's evidence was that the 
lower figure was inserted in the writing to conceal the true price from the purchaser's 
family. The case is discussed in the text accompanying note 29 infra. 
In Ferry v. Stephens, 66 N.Y. 321 (1876), the result of applying the parol evidence 
rule was to grant specific performance of a contract for the sale of land when, if the 
defendant's evidence was believed, there was no contract. The defendant's evidence was 
that the recital of consideration was a sham, that he intended to make a gift, but that 
the gift was ineffective for want of delivery. 
16. Zell v. American Seating Co., 138 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1943), rev'd, 322 U.S. 709 
(1944). See also Jarvis v. Cunliffe, 140 Conn. 297, 99 A.2d 126 (1953). 
17. 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 576, 581-83 (1950); Hale, The Parol Evidence Rule, 4 
ORE. L. REv. 91 (1925); Note, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 703 (1952). 
18. 138 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1943). 
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stated that the $1,000 monthly payment was plaintiff's full compensa-
tion.19 The plaintiff alleged that the commission arrangement was 
intended to be effective but was omitted from the writing because 
of the defendant's apprehension of "adverse comments ... made in 
Congress of such contingent-fee arrangements in connection with 
war contracts." Through the plaintiff's efforts contracts were ob-
tained on which he would have been entitled to approximately 
$178,000 in commissions under the oral agreement, and suit was 
brought to recover this amount after the defendant refused to pay. 
The Second Circuit, Judges L. Hand, Swan and Frank sitting, held 
that plaintiff could recover on the oral agreement if it were estab-
blished. The parol evidence rule was no bar since it does not apply 
where "it has been proved by extrinsic evidence that the parties did 
not intend [the writing] to be an exclusive authoritative memorial 
of their agreement."20 The judgment was reversed by the Supreme 
Court in a per curiam opinion stating that seven justices had voted 
for reversal, four because the plaintiff's proof was precluded by the 
parol evidence rule, three because the commission agreement was 
contrary to public policy and void.21 
The oral agreement in the Zell case directly contradicted the 
terms of the writing, and it is here undoubtedly that a court is most 
likely to hold that the writing controls as a matter of law.22 Yet a 
19. The written contract provided that the monthly payment "will be full compen-
sation, but the company may, if it desires, pay you something in the nature of a 
bonus." Id. at 642. 
20. Id. at 643. 
21. American Seating Co. v. Zell, 322 U.S. 709 (1944). 
22, Seitz v. Brewers' Refrigerating Mach. Co., 141 U.S. 510 (1891); Dalzell, Twenty-
Five Years of Parol Evidence in North Carolina, 33 N.CL. R.Ev. 420, 428 (1955). In a 
somewhat ambivalent discussion of the question whether a court may go behind an 
appearance of completeness, Williston wrote: 
Even if the oral agreement is repugnant to the writing, what was orally 
agreed would be of equal importance with what was written, since its existence 
would prove that there was no complete integration of the contract in regard to 
the matter to which it related. The parol evidence rule would then be of impor-
tance only as establishing a presumption that prior and contemporaneous oral 
agreements and negotiations were merged in the writing, but the practical value 
of the rule would be much impaired if either party to a writing were allowed 
to rebut the presumption by proof of any contemporaneous oral agreement. 
Certainly the law does not permit this. 
3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 633 (rev. ed. 1936). 
The "law" was prepared to permit this two centuries ago in Pitcairn v. Ogboume, 2 
Ves. Sr. 376, 28 Eng. Rep. 1079 (Ch. 1751). On the marriage of his son the plaintiff 
executed an "annuity-bond" promising to pay £ 150 per annum to the husband and 
wife. Later he sued "to be relieved" on the bond and introduced evidence to show 
that the actual agreement was for an annuity.of£ 100, the larger figure having been 
inserted in order to induce the bride's uncle to make a more generous provision for 
her. The court was prepared to grant relief except for the fact that it regarded the 
plaintiff as party to a fraudulent scheme and therefore not entitled to the aid of a 
court of equity. 
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comparison of the results achieved through reformation suggests 
that the parol evidence rule should not bar relief. If the agreement 
for commissions had been omitted from the writing- by mistake it 
would be given effect in equity through a decree for reformation. 
There are no sufficiently persuasive reasons for a different result 
because the incorrect expression was intentional. In each case the 
trier of the facts must be satisfied that there was such an oral agree-
ment and that this was the agreement the parties meant to put into 
effect. The burden of establishing these facts is heavy because the 
writing tends to speak for itself, but in the reformation cases this 
has led only to an insistence that the evidence be "clear and con-
vincing,"23 n?t to a denial of relief as a matter of law. The same 
approach should be taken to a case such as Zell. 
This is not to say that the two situations are in substance 
. identical, for they are not. The case for relief where there is mistake 
is beyond serious dispute. Mistake in expressing 1:he terms of a 
written transaction is so common that it would be intolerable to 
refuse correction of the writing so as to carry out the transaction 
intended. In addition, the fact that the parties attempted to express 
their agreement in the writing works in favor of reLef. The proper 
solution of a case such as Zell, where this factor is lacking, is more 
debatable, yet the similarity in the two situations is such as to sug-
gest that finality should not be attached to the writing in either. 
In both situations the party seeking relief from the writing must 
establish that the parties reached a certain agreement and that they 
intended it to become efl;ective. Since the writing d.oes not express 
this agreement there must be a convincing explanation of the dis-
crepancy. This is the purpose of evidence showing a mistake in inte-
gration: the affirmative effect of such evidence is to establish that the 
oral agreement was meant to be operative. It should be permissible 
to establish this ultimate fact by any other type of evidence. When 
there is no mistake in integration, any evidence that provides a 
rational explanation of the discrepancy is directed toward establish-
ing that the extrinsic agreement was meant to be effective. The 
plaintiff's allegations in Zell sought to provide such an explanation, 
but four justices of the Supreme Court held in effe,:t that such evi-
dence would be irrelevant.24 The writing was conclusive. This pre-
23. See note l supra. 
24. The four justices relied on the "applicable state parol evidence rule.'' 322 
U.S. 709 (1944). The Second Circuit concluded that Michigan law was applicable and 
relied on Woodard v. Walker, 192 Mich. 188, 158 N.W. 846 (1916). That, however, was 
a fase in which the court enforced an oral agreement after finding that a later 
written contract was a sham, not intended by the parties to have any legal effect, 
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sents the central issue, that is, whether the terms of a ·written contract 
can of their own force be conclusive, even though the parties did not 
intend them to be. Most authority seems to recognize that such force 
can be given to words.25 This does of course tend to support the 
stability of business arrangements reduced to writing, but at a cost 
when the writing does not express the true or the entire arrange-
ment-and no one really knows how high this cost is. 
If the position of the Second Circuit in Zell were to be accepted, 
the parol evidence rule would lose much of its significance as a rule 
of substantive law. It would become a complicated way of saying 
that a court will not enforce an oral agreement that varies from the 
writing unless satisfied that there was such an agreement and that 
it was meant to be controlling on the point in issue. Some differences 
would remain, however, between an intentional and a mistaken varia-
tion of the ·writing from the actual agreement, largely with respect 
to jury trial. When the case is concerned with the application of the 
parol evidence rule, as in Zell, it is commonly said that, even though 
the trial is to a jury, the judge is to decide whether the ·writing was 
intended by the parties to be the complete and accurate embodiment 
of the contract, or of that element of the contract in issue. If the 
judge finds there was such an integration, this makes the extrinsic 
agreement legally immaterial and the matter does not go to the jury. 
If he finds that there was not, he does not decide that there was such 
an agreement but merely that if there was it is legally effective; it 
is then left to the jury to determine the question of fact.26 
25. Lumber Underwriters v. Rife, 237 U.S. 605 (1915). Thus a "merger" or "inte-
gration" clause is usually regarded as conclusive. 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 578 (1950); 
McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 451-52 (1954). As a practical matter the clause will usually be 
decisive, but it should be susceptible of contradiction the same as any other term of 
the writing. This has been allowed in a few cases, e.g., Johns-Manville Corp. v. 
Heckart, 129 Ore. 505, 277 Pac. 821 (1929), where the court gave effect to an oral 
warranty on the ground that the statement in the merger clause "was not true." See 
also note 39 infra. 
26. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2430 (3d ed. 1940); McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule 
as a Procedural Device for Control of the Jury, 41 YALE L.J. 365, 374-75 (1932). Dean 
McCormick would insist on certain minimum evidentiary requirements for making 
this initial determination. "Let the trial judge," he suggests, "after hearing the testi-
mony as to the alleged oral agreement, including the evidence of substantiating 
circumstances, compare it with the terms of the writing, and if he considers that it 
is one which parties situated as these were would 'naturally and normally' have 
recited in the writing itself, had they made it and intended it to stand, then he will 
reject the evidence thus tentatively heard." McCormick, supra at 379. See also 
REs'I'ATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 240 (1932). This would lead, quite unnecessarily, to a 
refusal to enforce the oral agreement in Higgs v. de Maziroff, 263 N.Y. 473, 189 N.E. 
555 (1934) (discussed in text accompanying note 13 supra). 
McCormick was concerned only with keeping cases that did not satisfy his test 
out of the hands of the jury. The test would thus be irrelevant to a case such as Grubb 
v. Rockey, 366 Pa. 592, 79 A.2d 255 (1951), where the suit was in equity for specific 
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On the other hand, had there been mistake in integration in Zell, 
all issues of fact with respect to the making of the oral agreement 
and the reason why it was not expressed in the writing would be 
in equity under the traditional view. Even under the Second Cir-
cuit's formulation of the parol evidence rule in that case, the rule 
still applies when there is mistake, since this means that the parties 
did intend to embody the agreement in the vrriting.27 According to 
the traditions of the law court the oral agreement was of no legal 
significance; only equity gave relief to the injured party through 
reformation.28 Whether the different modes of trial of the fact issues, 
dependent on whether the variation was intentional or uninten-
tional, should persist today is another question, to be discussed here-
inafter. 
Ill. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE P AROL EVIDENCE 
RULE AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
In Grubb v. Rockey29 the price stipulated in a written contract 
for the sale of land was $10,000, and after the purchaser had paid 
performance. In that case, presumably, he would be satisfied to let the judge decide 
whether the oral agreement was made and was meant to be controlling. But it seems 
unfortunate to preserve a distinction between law and equity to the end that in 
equity the contract enforced will be the one made, whereas at law it will sometimes be 
the one expressed in the writing. (As to whether the true agreement could be en-
forced in equity on the facts of Grubb v. Rockey, this depends on the effect of the 
statute of frauds and is discussed in the text accompanying note 31 infra.) 
27. The rule would still have the effect of turning some questions into questions 
of interpretation. If the parties intended to embody their entire agreement in the 
writing, and did so without mistake in expression, a difference of opinion over the 
meaning of the writing raises only an issue of interpretation. Evidence of what the 
parties intended must be directed to explaining the writing, rather than giving effect 
to an oral agreement as such. Although it is sometimes difficult to know where inter-
pretation ends and reformation begins, it is submitted that there should be no 
gap between the two. That is, if the parties reached an agreement which they meant 
to express in the writing, the agreement should be made effective either through 
interpretation or reformation. See Sadowski v. General Discount Corp., 81 F. Supp. 
381 (E.D. Mich. 1948). Whether there sometimes is such a gap is a puzzling question: 
if there is, this probably occurs because of the view that "oral statements by the 
parties of what they intended" cannot be used in construing a written contract. 
RF.sTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 230 (1932). Any such rule should be rejected. It seems to 
have originated in the interpretation of wills, where the testator's "declarations of 
intention" are usually regarded as inadmissible. 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 543 (1950): 
9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2471 (3d ed. 1940). Whatever the reasons may be for such an 
exclusion, they arise out of the requirements of the statute of wills, and it is a Inistake 
to carry the idea over to the interpretation of written contracts. 
28. The written contract may not have been in accordance with the intention 
of the parties. It may have expressed, by mistake, one consideration, when the 
real intention out of Inind at the moment of its execution, was that it should 
have expressed another. But, whatever may have been the mistake, or how 
produced, it can find no recognition until the written contract shall have been 
reformed and made to conform to the intention of the parties, and this, a Court 
of Law, cannot effect. A Court of Equity alone can reform a written contract. 
Boyce v. Wilson, 32 Md. 122, 129 (1869). 
29. 366 Pa. 592, 79 A.2d 255 (1951). 
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that amount he sued for specific performance. The vendor's defense 
was that the agreed price was actually $11,200, but that the lower 
figure was inserted in the writing to conceal the true price from the 
purchaser's family. The trial judge found this to be the agreement 
and refused specific performance, but this was reversed by the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court on the basis of the parol evidence rule; even 
accepting the fact that the actual agreement was for a price of 
$11,200, the legally effective contract according to the appellate 
court was the one expressed in the writing. 
This is of course a rejection of the view that the parol evidence 
rule applies only when the parties intended the writing to be a 
complete and accurate expression of their entire agreement, or at 
least of the term in question. Like Zell it illustrates the thin line 
between the case before the court and a case of mistake in integra-
tion. Had the parties intended to insert a price of $11,200 in the 
writing, the mistaken insertion of the $10,000 figure would by most 
authority provide a ground for reformation in favor of the vendor, 
leading to the enforcement of their actual agreement instead of the 
enforcement of a contract they never made. Mistake is accepted as 
an explanation of the discrepancy, but all other explanations are 
rejected, no matter how clearly proved and believable they may be. 
Had the Pennsylvania court followed the position taken by the 
Second Circuit in Zell, the parol evidence rule would not have 
barred enforcement of the true agreement, but enforcement would 
have been barred by the statute of frauds. At this point there is a 
critical difference between the case before the court and the case of 
mistake in integration. In the latter, the statute of frauds should not 
prevent reformation, since the reformation decree is not an enforce-
ment of the oral agreement. The decree merely corrects the writing; 
if enforcement follows either in the same action or in a separate 
action it is the written contract as reformed which is being enforced, 
not the oral agreement as such.30 On the facts of Grubb v. Rockey, 
however, enforcement of the agreed price of $11,200 at suit of the 
vendor would be the direct enforcement of an oral term of the 
contract and this would be in conflict with the statute of frauds.31 
This does not mean that, in the suit for specific performance 
!10. There is considerable diversity of decision on the point but the analysis in the 
text is believed to be a correct statement of the role of reformation and finds strong 
support in the cases. The general problem is the effect of the statute of frauds on 
the reformation of executory contracts and is discussed in Palmer, Reformation and 
The Statute of Frauds, 65 MICH. L. REv. 421 (1967). 
lll. It is generally agreed that in a contract for the sale of land the memorandum 
required by the statute of frauds must include the price. 2 CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs § 501 
(1950). 
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brought by the purchaser, the contract should have been enforced 
as written, for this is not a permissible application of the statute 
of frauds. The effect of the statute is to bar enforcement of various 
unwritten agreements, by providing in substance that in order to be 
enforceable the agreement must b~ in a prescribed form. It is not 
the purpose of the statute to produce enforcement of a "contract" 
the parties never made. This is the effect of the parol evidence rule, 
as applied by the Pennsylvania court, but it is never a proper conse-
quence of the statute of frauds.32 Neither the language nor the policy 
of the statute supports such a result. 
In Grubb v. Rockey the Pennsylvania court should have held 
that the vendor had a defense to the purchaser's suit for specific 
performance, provided the vendor established the oral agreement 
by clear and convincing evidence. The oral agreement would pre-
vent enforcement of the written contract, but the statute of frauds 
would prevent enforcement of the oral agreement, leaving the parties 
with no enforceable contract for the sale of the land. But the pur-
chaser had paid $10,000 on the price, and should be entitled to 
recover this payment in quasi contract unless the vendor is prepared 
to perform the oral agreement, as he apparently was in that case. 
If so, the probable result would be a completion of the transaction 
in accordance with the oral agreement.33 
IV. REFORMATION TO ADD A PROVISION INTENTIONALLY OMITIED 
Numerous cases have held that reformation cannot be obtained 
so as to add to the writing an extrinsic agreement meant to be 
effective but omitted intentionally from the writing.34 The generally 
agreed objective of the remedy is to correct the writing so that it 
conforms to the agreement the parties meant to embody in the 
writing; mistake in integration is therefore a necessary element 
which is lacking in such cases. In Brintnall v. Briggs35 the parties 
entered into a ·written contract for the sale of a store building and 
the stock in trade, and, although the writing was silent on the point, 
32. 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 498 (1950). 
33. This statement slides over some difficult practical problems of judicial ad• 
ministration, but is believed to be correct so far as it goes. 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 298 
(1950). 
34. Taylor v. Fowler, 155 Ga. 654, 118 S.E. 212 (1923); Graves v. Greenfiel, 196 
Iowa 696, 195 N.W. 252 (1923); Brintnall v. Briggs, 87 Iowa 538, 54 N.W. 531 (1893); 
H. C. Whitmer Co. v. Jordan, 230 Ky. 710, 20 S.W.2d 714 (1929); Holcomb v. Czenkusch, 
222 Mich. 376, 192 N.W. 548 (1923); Wilson v. Deen, 74 N.Y. 531 (1878); Saum v. 
Orrill, 42 N.E.2d 925 (Ohio App. 1942); Brosnihan v. Brosnihan, 180 Wis. 360, 193 N.W. 
74 (1923). 
35. 87 Iowa 538, 54 N.W. 531 (1893). 
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the buyer claimed there was a contemporaneous oral agreement by 
the seller not to engage in a similar business in the locality. The 
buyer sued to reform the writing so as to include this oral agreement 
and to recover damages for its breach, but relief was denied. In 
deciding against the buyer the court pointed out that he did not 
claim the oral agreement was omitted by mistake; thus there was 
no basis for reformation, and recovery on the oral agreement would 
be "in plain conflict" with the parol evidence rule. Such decisions 
rest upon an express or tacit rejection of the view that the parol 
evidence rule applies only when the parties intended to integrate 
their agreement in the writing. Intentional omission demonstrates 
that the provision was not meant to be integrated in the writing, and 
a complete acceptance of the view that this makes the parol evidence 
rule inapplicable would destroy the need for reformation.36 
Occasionally a court, restive perhaps under the weight of a rule 
that denies recognition of the actual agreement, escapes through 
the avenue of reformation instead of making a direct attack on the 
proper scope of the rule. In a California case37 the plaintiff peach 
grower entered into a written contract as a "grower" at a stipulated 
price which was the usual price for "grower contracts." In fact, 
however, it was understood between the parties that he was to be 
treated as a "renter" and receive the higher price incident to "renter 
contracts." The court ordered reformation of the contract to comply 
with the extrinsic agreement and entered judgment for the sum due 
on the contract as reformed. The extrinsic agreement was omitted 
from the contract intentionally and the generally accepted basis 
for reformation was therefore lacking. At the same time the evidence 
showed that the writing was not intended to be a complete and 
accurate expression of the agreement. If this of itself makes the parol . 
evidence rule inapplicable, as it should, there was nothing to stand 
in the way of the enforcement of the oral agreement as such. The 
tacit assumption that this could not be done without reformation 
rested on the view, seen in many cases, that when the writing has 
the appearance of completeness this forecloses further inquiry into 
whether the parties intended it as such.38 
A few cases have reached the same result by treating the defen-
36. Again, the separate effect of the statute of frauds must be considered where 
the transaction is required to be in writing under that statute. The only way to make 
the oral agreement enforceable in such a case is to introduce it into the writing, 
but there is no ground for doing so when it was omitted intentionally. 
37. Stafford v. California Canning Peach Growers, 11 Cal. 2d 212, 78 P.2d 1150 
(19!18). 
38. Another example of this use of reformation is Day v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 
67 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1933). 
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dant's assertion of rights under the writing in breach of his oral 
agreement as a fraud on the plaintiff, and then proceeding on the 
broad ground that equity will "interfere to prevent the fraudulent 
use of a paper for a purpose not contemplated at the time it was 
made."39 Essentially this is a refusal of equity to accept the applica-
tion of the parol evidence rule so as to deny effect to the actual 
agreement. The relief usually takes the form of reformation, but 
in one case the court enjoined the defendant from maintaining an 
action to enforce the writing in violation of the oral agreement.40 
If this is the best that can be done the solution is acceptable, for 
equity has asserted a residual power to give relief in the nature of 
reformation when there seems to be no other satisfactory way to 
prevent a manifest injustice. In these instances, however, the in-
justice arises because a rule of law is thought to prevent recognition 
of an actual agreement. What is needed is a re-examination of the 
scope of that rule. 
V. THE ROLES OF LAW AND EQUITY 
A. Mistake in Integration 
As we have seen, in cases not involving mistake in integration a 
party seeking to avoid application of the parol evidence rule does 
so by attempting to establish that the parties did not intend to em-
body the agreement or some aspect of it in the writing. In reforma-
tion cases, on the other hand, it is usually conceded that the parties 
did so intend, but the claim is made that the writing is an incorrect 
expression of the agreement. As Anglo-American law developed, the 
law courts held that the ·writing was controlling, and thus it was left 
to equity to give relief through reformation. Under older procedures 
the evidence of the extrinsic agreement would be received only 
39. Murray v. Dake, 46 Cal. 644, 648 (1873); Wollan v. McKay, 24 Idaho 691, 135 
Pac. 832 (1913). This seems as good an explanation as any of Brandwein v. Provident 
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 3 N.Y.2d 491, 146 N.E.2d 693 (1957), where the court had to escape 
the effect of both the parol evidence rule (as it conceived the rule) and the statute of 
frauds. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court used the "fraud" label as a reason for holding 
the parol evidence rule inapplicable in a law action. International Milling Co. v. 
Hachmeister Inc., 380 Pa. 407, 110 A.2d 186 (1955). A written contract not only had 
the appearance of completeness but also contained an "integration clause" ("This 
contract constitutes the complete agreement between the parties hereto"), but the 
court nonetheless gave effect to an extrinsic agreement of the seller that flour was to 
conform to certain quality standards. The court's statement that there was fraud in 
the making of the contract was not supported by the evidence set forth in the opinion 
-it was merely a manipulation of words in order to avoid the undesirable conse-
quences of a rule without re-examining the content of the rule itself. 
40. Taylor v. Gilman, 25 Vt. 411 (1853). The consequence was to give effect to the 
extrinsic agreement. 
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where the pleadings specifically indicated that reformation was 
sought:41 
Modem procedural reforms have forced courts to refashion the 
historic distinction benveen law and equity. In modem procedure 
it is coming to be recognized that a formal prayer for reformation 
is not needed in order to achieve the results of reformation where 
such results are warranted by the facts.42 Hence, if the plaintiff seeks 
a money judgment to which he would be entitled under the actual 
agreement, but the written contract varies from this agreement, it 
would seem that he should recover when he pleads and proves the 
facts that provide a basis for reformation, even though his complaint 
is not in the form of a bill in equity containing a prayer for such 
relief.48 Once this is recognized, it seems that parol evidence has 
been admitted in a law action to vary the terms of the writing. As 
to what, if anything, is left of the distinction between law and equity, 
the chief question has related to jury trial. 
On the facts just described, where a party seeks affirmative relief 
justified only if the writing is reformed, there is general agreement 
that the issue of mistake is equitable, with no constitutional right to 
jury trial in most states.44 This does not of course settle the question 
whether trial of the issue should be by court or jury when other 
issues in the case are being tried by jury. The question is one to be 
worked out by legislation or judicial decision, unless the jurisdiction 
is one of the few in which there is said to be a constitutional right 
41. Forsythe v. Kimball, 91 U.S. 291 (1875); Goldband v. Allen, 245 Mass. 143, 139 
N.E. 834 (1923); Van Syck.el v. Dalrymple, 32 N.J. Eq. 233 (Ch. 1880); Vermont Marble 
Co. v. Eastman, 91 Vt. 425, 101 Atl. 151 (1917). 
42. United States Plywood Corp. v. Hudson Lumber Co., 210 F.2d 462, 465 (2d 
Cir. 1954); Broidy v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 186 F.2d 490, 496 (2d Cir. 1951) 
(dictum); Del Rio Bank & Trust Co. v. Cornell, 57 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1932): Metro• 
politan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Friedley, 79 F. Supp. 978 (N.D. Iowa 1948); Hayes v. Flesher, 
34 Idaho 13, 198 Pac. 678 (1921) (suit in equity); Cox v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 172 
Miss. 841, 160 So. 741 (1935); First Nat'l Bank v. Oppenheimer, 123 Wash. 290, 212 
Pac. 164 (1923). 
An example of dogged insistence on adherence to outmoded procedure is Blay v. 
Pollard, [19!10] 1 K.B. 628 (C.A.), where one reason given for reversing a judgment 
allowing mistake in integration as a defense was that the defendant's pleadings did not 
include a prayer for reformation. 
43. Calton v. Lewis, 119 Ind. 181, 21 N.E. 475 (1889); Ragsdale v. Turner, 141 Iowa 
604, 120 N.W. 109 (1909); Dahlhjelm Garages v. Mercantile Ins. Co., 149 Wash. 184, 
270 Pac. 434 (1928). Contra, Farquhar v. Farquhar, 194 Mass. 400, 80 N.E. 654 (1907). 
Recovery in quasi contract is regularly allowed where the purchaser of land in a 
sale by the acre has overpaid due to a deficiency in acreage. Usually the contract will 
call for a lump sum price so that proof of the basis of the sale comes from extrinsic 
evidence and recovery of the overpayment rests essentially on reformation of the 
price term. The parol evidence problem goes largely unnoticed. Cases are collected in 
Annot., 153 A.L.R. 4, at 19 (1944). 
44. City of Morgantown v. Royal Ins. Co., 169 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1948). Reformation 
was denied when the case was tried on the merits, 98 F. Supp. 609 (N.D. W. Va. 1951). 
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to a non-jury trial of equitable issues.45 Under the usual procedure 
trial will be by the court,46 but this is not the universal practice. 
In a Nebraska case, for example, the action was to recover for the 
loss by fire of buildings allegedly insured by the defendant, but one 
of the buildings was on land not described in the policy. It was held 
within the trial court's authority to let the whole case go to the jury, 
including proof of mistake in integration, and a judgment in favor 
of the insured as though the policy had been reformed was affirmed.47 
The relation between law and equity has arisen most frequently 
where mistake in integration was asserted as a defense to an action 
at law. The widespread allowance of equitable defenses at law48 
means that the reformation issue will be decided in the single action. 
Most courts follow the view that the mode of trial developed in 
equity should be employed for the equitable issue,49 but until 
recently New York was a notable exception. In an action to recover 
money due under the terms of a written contract the court of 
appeals held that the defendant could introduce evidence to estab-
lish a different agreement which the writing failed to express because 
of mistake, with all the evidence to go to the jury.50 There are occa-
sional instances of a similar practice in other states. 51 
Such decisions suggest a need for re-examining the policies be-
hind the parol evidence rule. Beginning with Thayer's classic analysis 
in 189852 attention became centered on the rule as one of substantive 
law until McCormick pointed to its importance as a "procedural 
45. Van Hecke, Trial by Jury in Equity Cases, 31 N.C.L. REv. 157 (1953); Note, The 
Right to a Nonjury Trial, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1176 (1961). 
46. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 91-110 (2d ed. 1947); JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 8.7 (1965); 
5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 38.16, .22 (2d ed. 1966). 
47. Central Granaries Co. v. Nebraska Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 106 Neb. 80, 
182 N.W. 582 (1921). In actions on insurance policies there are many cases that could 
be analyzed as calling for reformation which in fact are settled in a law action through 
applying the concept of estoppel. VANCE, INSURANCE 513-47 (3d ed. 1951). Estoppel is 
also sometimes used in other situations. Schlosser v. Nicholson, 184 Ind. 283, Ill N.E. 
13 (1916). See also the Pennsylvania cases cited in note 56 infra. 
48. Joiner & Geddes, The Union of Law and Equity, 55 MICH. L. REv. 1059, 1112 
(1957). 
49. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Strickland, 187 F.2d 67 (6th Cir. 1951); CLARK, 
CODE PLEADING 103-06, 621-28 (2d ed. 1947); Clark, Trial of Actions Under the Code, 
11 CORNELL L.Q. 482 (1926). 
50. Susquehanna S.S. Co. v. Andersen & Co., 239 N.Y. 285, 146 N.E. 381 (1925). 
Three of the seven judges dissented, without opinion. Accord, Bugen v. New York Life 
Ins. Co., 408 Pa. 472, 184 A.2d 499 (1962). 
51. Zuspann v. Roy, 102 Kan. 188, 170 Pac. 387 (1918); Bugen v. New York Life 
Ins. Co., supra note 50. 
52. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE ch. IO (1898). See also Thayer, 
The "Parol Evidence" Rule, 6 HARv. L. REv. 325 (1893). Thayer's analysis was accepted 
by Wigmore. See 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2425 (3d ed. 1940). 
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device for control of the jury."53 For cases of mistake in integration 
the effect of the rule was to avoid what he described as: 
[the] grave danger that honest expectations, based upon carefully 
considered written transactions, may be defeated through the sympa-
thetic, if not credulous, acceptance by juries of fabricated or wish-
born oral agreement. Likewise, some peril to justice and to the 
stability of business transactions lies in the possibility that earlier 
and tentative oral agreements which were part of the preliminary 
parleying, but were actually understood by both parties to be 
abandoned when omitted in the final written agreement, will be 
stoutly asserted by one party at the trial as having been intended 
to stand alongside the writing. When a genuine, but superseded, 
oral agreement is thus set up, it will be even harder for the jury to 
reject the claim based on such agreement than if it were fabricated 
from the whole cloth.54 
Although this danger was recognized by the New York Court of 
AppeaJs,55 it cannot be said that the court was expressing a prefer-
ence for leaving the issues to the jury despite the danger; rather, 
the decision rested wholly on the court's construction of a provision 
of the procedure code. To guard against the danger, Judge Cardozo 
said, there should be a "strict enforcement" of the rule applied in 
equity with respect to the weight of the evidence needed to over-
come the writing. That is, the evidence must be "clear and con-
vincing," or as Cardozo expressed it "of the clearest and most satis-
factory character." Even with this safeguard, which it is difficult to 
make effective,56 it seems wise to preserve for most cases the historic 
mode of trial of equity issues. It may be largely a historical accident 
that the separate jurisdictions of law and equity sometimes had a 
53. McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for Control of 
the Jury, 41 YALE L.J. 365 (1932). 
54. Id. at 367. Dean McCormick was describing the dangers involved where there 
is no claim of mistake, but his description is also apt where there is such a claim. 
55. "Juries may find it difficult to apply the presumption that preliminary treaties 
are merged in the written contract if they are permitted to consider such treaties as 
evidence of mistake." Susquehanna S.S. Co. v. Andersen 8c Co., 239 N.Y. 285, 296, 146 
N.E. 381, 385 (1925). 
56. Note, 11 CORNELL L.Q. 396, 400 (1926). In Bugen v. New York Life Ins. Co., 408 
Pa. 472, 184 A.2d 499 (1962), where the issue of mistake in integration was submitted 
to a jury, the appellate court said that the evidence "must be clear, convincing, and 
of the most satisfactory character," but there is no indication that such an instruction 
was given the jury. Presumably, however, such an instruction is called for in Penn-
sylvania. Broida v. Travelers Ins. Co., 316 Pa. 444, 175 Atl. 492 (1934). Where there are 
other questions of fact in the case, it may be unsatisfactory to submit the whole case 
to the jury with a set of instructions presenting different standards of proof on the 
different issues. This apparently was done in Zuspann v. Roy, 102 Kan. 188, 170 Pac. 
387 (1918). 
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rational relation to the different modes of trial, 117 but as McCormick 
suggests there is such a relation here. 
The New York practice has been changed in that state's new 
Civil Practice Law by providing that "equitable defenses and equi-
table counterclaims shall be tried by the court."118 This creates a 
statutory right to a non-jury trial. There are instances in which the 
correction of a manifest error has been allowed in a law action with-
out any need perceived for separating the legal and equitable 
issues.59 The New York legislation should not interfere with the 
sensible administration of such cases. 
B. Intentional Variation 
There is also need for examination of the manner of trial where 
no mistake in integration is claimed. As we have seen, it is commonly 
stated that the parol evidence rule applies only when the parties 
intended to embody in the writing either the entire agreement or 
at least that part with respect to which the extrinsic evidence is 
relevant. No one doubts that there are times when this question of 
intent will be decided on all the evidence. The principal difference 
of opinion is over whether this will be done when the writing seems 
on its face to be either a complete expression of the agreement or 
at least a final expression of the term in issue. Thoughtful writers 
have argued that this question of intention is to be decided by the 
judge, 60 and there is substantial judicial recognition of the theoretical 
soundness of this view.61 The theory is sometimes difficult to apply, 
although this tends to be obscured by the usual way of stating the 
57. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 8.2 (1965). The text of this part of Professor James' 
book appears also in James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 
661 (1963). 
58. N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 4101. 
59. Brilliant v. Silk, 290 Mass. 537, 195 N.E. 737 (1935); Schultz v. Charleston, 261 
Ill. App. 51 (1931). Other cases are cited in 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACI'S § 1599 (rev. ed. 1937). 
In England it is said that "both Courts of law and of equity may correct an obvious 
mistak~ on the face of an instrument without the slightest difficulty." Wilson v. 
Wilson, [1854] 5 H.L.C. 40, 66, 10 Eng. Rep. 811, 822. 
60. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2430 (3d ed. 1940); Harvey, The Use of Parol Evidence in 
Cases Involving Written Instruments, 34 Mich. St. B.J., No. 5, pp. 8, 16 (1955); 
McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for Control of the Jury, 
41 YALE L.J. 365, 374-75 (1932). See also note 26 supra. 
61. Seitz v. Brewers' Refrigerating Mach. Co., 141 U.S. 510 (1891); McDonnell v. 
General News Bureau, 93 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1937); South Florida Lumber Mills v. 
Breuchaud, 51 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1931); Brown v. Oliver, 123 Kan. 711, 256 Pac. 1008 
(1927); Gianni v. R. Russel & Co., 281 Pa. 320, 126 Atl. 791 (1924). Contra, Jarvis v. 
Cunliffe, 140 Conn. 297, 99. A.2d 126 (1953). The usual way of stating the position 
that the issue is for the court is in terms of admissibility of evidence: "The question 
is one for the court, for it relates to the admission or rejection of evidence." Naum-
berg v. Young, 44 N.J.L. 331, 339 (Ct. App. 1882). 
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problem, that is, in terms of intent to integrate.62 The real issues 
are whether the parties made the agreement in question and whether 
they meant it to be effective despite the writing. According to the 
aforementioned theory of the judge's function, he is to assume for 
purposes of decision that the agreement was made and then to decide 
whether it was intended to be effective.Ga But in many instances the 
two issues are virtually inseparable. It is not a hypothetical case 
that is up for decision but an actual case, to be decided on all the 
evidence. 
In Grubb v. Rockey,G4 where the writing specified a price of 
$10,000 but the vendor claimed that the true oral agreement was 
for $11,200, it would be difficult psychologically for the judge to 
decide that the parties intended an oral agreement, if there was one, 
to be effective, without also deciding that the parties made such an 
agreement. In the converse situation it will often be feasible for 
the judge to decide that, even though such an agreement was made, 
it was not intended to be effective when the writing was signed. 
In other instances however, if the judge decides that no such agree-
ment was to be effective he will also have decided that no such agree-
ment was made.fi5 In the Grubb case, instead of trying to make such 
a difficult provisional judgment, the court took the easy way out by 
attaching an unwarranted finality to the written word. This may 
well explain the judicial tendency to make conclusive an appearance 
of completeness in the instrument. Thereby the court avoids the 
necessity of deciding an issue of fact that is conceived to be outside 
its province. This keeps the issue from the jury in situations where 
the court would decide, given the chance, that there was no such 
extrinsic agreement as one party claims. Unfortunately, however, it 
means also that courts have declared themselves powerless to give 
effect to actual agreements no matter how clear the evidence of 
agreement. In a case such as Grubb v. Rockey the court should in 
62. Thus, in South Florida Lumber Mills v. Breucbaud, 51 F.2d 490, 493 (5th Cir. 
1931), the issue stated was "whether the matter sought to be orally proven has been 
integrated in the written agreement, by ascertaining from the conduct and language of 
the parties, and the surrounding circumstances, what was their intent." 
63. If he decides that the transaction was covered by the writing, he does not 
decide that the excluded negotiations did not take place, but merely that if 
they did take place they are nevertheless legally immaterial. If he decides that 
the transaction was not intended to be covered by the writing, he does not 
decide that the negotiations did take place, but merely that if they did, they are 
legally effective, and he then leaves to the jury the determination of fact 
whether they did take place. 
9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2430 (3d ed. 1940). 
64. See note 29 supra. 
65. An example is South Florida Lumber Mills v. Breuchaud, 51 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 
1931). 
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the first instance decide both questions. If it finds no oral agreement 
which was meant to be effective that ends the matter. Decision of 
the issues without a jury presents no serious constitutional question 
since there has been at most a trial of issues that previously went 
untried.66 If the court finds that there was an oral agreement which 
the parties meant to be effective, the evidence can go to the jury 
with final power to decide. 67 
VI. CONCLUSION 
From one point of view the relation of the parol evidence rule to 
mistake in integation can be put quite simply. The rule does not 
bar reformation when there is clear and convincing evidence that 
terms of an agreement meant to be included in the writing were 
misstated or omitted by mistake. But reformation is not available 
to insert terms which the parties intentionally omitted. 
When the problems of the parol evidence rule are viewed from 
the reformation side, by comparing results reached where the dis-
crepancy between the ·writing and the true· agreement was uninten-
tional with the results reached where it was intentional, some widely 
accepted applications of the rule seem unsatisfactory. There are dif-
ferences in the two situations but they are insufficient to warrant 
the marked disparity of results. The disparity should be eliminated 
so as to permit recognition of the actual agreement when the court 
is satisfied that this was the agreement. The parol evidence rule 
should not be used so as to enforce a contract the parties never made, 
when this is known to be the case. 
66. This is what occurs when the court holds the writing conclusive and the 
extrinsic evidence therefore "inadmissible." 
67. The jury could find there was no oral agreement even though the judge had 
decided otherwise in letting the evidence go to the jury. Whether the jury's finding is 
sufficiently supported by the evidence would be tested by the usual standard. 
